Language and perceptual categorisation by Davidoff, Jules B.
TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences  Vol.5 No.9  September 2001
http://tics.trends.com
382 Opinion
Why do category members belong together? Or, put
another way, why are category members seen as
similar and different from members of other
categories? For most categories, it can be concluded
that the answers to these questions are determined by
theories about the world, rather than perceptual
similarity between category members1. However, for
perceptual categories (e.g. colours, facial expressions)
the role of perceptual similarity in establishing
categories seems more plausible. I will argue that
though plausible, it is not perceptual similarity, but
rather linguistic similarity that is the critical factor in
perceptual categorisation. It has also been argued, in
the case of colour, that there are underlying, universal,
neurophysiological mechanisms determining
categorisation2,3. I will argue against that view. The
arguments in favour of language will draw on
neuropsychological and cross-cultural research; these
will be reinforced by results from interference studies.
Colour categories are not innate
The proposal for universal colour categories2 is held to
gain strength from the known properties of
wavelength-sensitive neurones4. Based on the
opponent-process mechanism of neurones in the
lateral geniculate nucleus and in V1, it was argued
that there are two elemental achromatic categories
(black, white) and four elemental colour categories
(red, green, yellow and blue)3,5,6. The four colour
categories are held to form around natural foci that
produce uniquely red, green, yellow and blue
sensations. The argument is based on the finding that
there are two wavelengths for which opponent-process
neurons termed R–G give no output4. Similarly, there
is a wavelength that corresponds to no output from the
other type of opponent-process neurones, termed Y–B.
However, the respective wavelengths chosen to
correspond to the typical or unique colours of blue,
yellow and green do not consistently match the
predictions from neurophysiology7. In fact, it ought to
go without saying that no firm conclusion concerning
neurones could really be drawn by asking a person
who already has the concept of blue, yellow or green to
indicate a colour that is uniquely blue (or yellow or
green). Furthermore, the unique colours produced by
colour-blind observers do not tally with the predictions
made from their altered retinal output8. In fact, the
neurophysiological data show that neurones simply
respond selectively to particular wavelengths9, or to
combinations of wavelength and brightness10. Such
selectivity is insufficient to allow that the neurones act
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in a categorical manner. There is no evidence that
neurones respond selectively to any of the four basic
colours, let alone selectively to those that we might
call purple, brown, and so on.
Perceptual categories cannot be based on observation
Before considering the empirical evidence, I will
outline the philosophical stance that observation
alone can never produce perceptual categories.
Consider colour concepts: for colour, it might seem
obvious that observation would be enough to answer
the simple question as to why two ‘reds’ look like each
other, whereas a ‘red’and a ‘yellow’do not. However,
colour categories are not supported by a direct and
simple relationship with similarity11,12. If colour
concepts were based solely on observation they would
lead to a paradox – the so-called ‘Sorites paradox’.
For example, take the case of a series of colour
patches of decreasing wavelength, each of which is
indistinguishable from its immediate neighbours
because the steps in wavelength are below threshold
for the human visual system. One end patch, it is
agreed, can be called ‘red’. If red is a truly perceptual
or observational category then the immediate
neighbour of this patch must also be called ‘red’. But,
so by extension must its immediate neighbours.
Pursuing the reasoning, one arrives at the
paradoxical conclusion that all colours in the series
(even ‘blues’at the other end) must be called ‘red’.
Thus, so as not to be trapped in the paradox, we
require a non-perceptual mechanism to form
categories. I shall argue that the mechanism is
language. However, even if one were inclined to
dismiss the Sorites paradox as a pseudo-problem
based on unwarranted assumptions about
thresholds13, one would still need to account for the
neuropsychological evidence. Patients with language
impairments caused by brain damage behave as if
the Sorites paradox is a reality14.
Neuropsychological evidence
Brain damage that produces language impairments
makes perceptual categorisation, including colour
categorisation, very difficult14,15. We recently
examined such a patient (L.E.W.) with normal colour
vision who had no difficulty in recognising and
interacting with objects15,16. His comprehension was
generally excellent16. However, L.E.W. had marked
difficulties with all types of spoken output. With
respect to colour, he could not name or comprehend
colour names, and experienced great difficulty in
sorting colours into groups; for facial expressions
there were similar problems (Box 1). His performance
was marked by an adherence to pair-wise similarity
comparisons. As consideration of the Sorites paradox
shows, this would, and indeed did, lead him to group
colours and facial expressions in a way that could be
considered paradoxical or incoherent. L.E.W.’s sorting
was exactly like that Goldstein14 proposed to be an
inevitable consequence of what is now called anomic
aphasia. These patients, according to Goldstein, do
not have an abstract attitude towards sorting tasks,
but are driven by concrete associations. For example,
one of his patients categorised a hammer with a
saucepan because both were to be found in his
kitchen. For colours, such associations are minimal.
So, lacking an abstract attitude, L.E.W. is forced to
sort by perceptual similarity and thereby reveal no
effects of category boundaries.
Cross-cultural evidence
Original studies
Colour categories have played an important role in
determining the theoretical structure of concepts.
Rosch’s analysis17–19 helped mark the first shift away
from defining-attribute theories of concepts (classical
theory) to characteristic-attribute theories (prototype
theory)20. Furthermore, Rosch’s seminal work claimed a
universal rather than language-based aspect to colour
categories because of the cognitive similarities between
languages with few colour terms and English21,22.
The view prior to Rosch’s work was derived from the
linguistic relativity hypothesis of Whorf23,who said
that ‘We dissect nature along lines laid down by our
native language’ (p. 231). However, contrary to the
Whorfian view, Rosch argued that the perceptual or
cognitive division of colour space was universal.
Rosch’s cross-cultural investigations of colour
categories compared naming and memory for colours
between an American English population and a
Stone-age agricultural population in Irian Jaya 
(the ‘Dugum’Dani). The ‘Dugum’Dani subjects
(hereafter called Dani) were reported by K. Heider24
to have only two basic2 colour terms. In the first of her
seminal experiments, Rosch found that the two
populations with widely differing colour vocabularies
remembered colours in very similar ways that were
not affected by differences in colour naming22. In two
further critical experiments21, she also found that
despite having only two colour terms, the Dani 
found it easier to recognise and learn the ‘foci’
(best examples) of the eight basic chromatic
categories of English2. Thus, her cross-cultural
research showed evidence of superior learning and
memory for focal colours by subjects who did not code
the categories linguistically.
Rosch’s results have been widely accepted as
proving the case for universal basic colour categories,
but some potentially serious flaws have been pointed
out in both the design and interpretation of her
studies. In the first experiment22, two different
measures, both based on multidimensional scaling of
‘...so as not to be trapped in the
[Sorites] paradox, we require a
non-perceptual mechanism to
form categories.’
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the same data set, gave conflicting results.
A graphical demonstration supported the view that
colour categorisation is universal, but a statistical
measure suggested that speakers of different
languages organize their perceptual or cognitive
categories in line with their different linguistic
codings. The graphical result (that supporting the
universalist view) was accepted, but no proper
explanation was given of why the statistical analysis
of the data failed to support this interpretation. For
the second and third studies21, Rosch’s interpretation
is weakened by the extremely poor performance of
Dani speakers on these tasks.
In light of the concerns about the interpretation of
Rosch’s data, we attempted to replicate those three
experiments. No other culture has since been found to
have as few as two basic colour terms; indeed,
Rosch25 casts some doubt as to whether the Dani
might have had as few as two basic terms. In the
present investigation, native English-speaking
subjects were compared to monolingual Berinmo
speakers (see Box 2) from three villages in Papua
New Guinea, whose language contains five basic
colour terms. We were unable to repeat her
findings26,27. Furthermore, new experiments further
weakened the case for universal colour categories.
Categorical perception
Our new experiments made use of a property of
categories that is known as ‘categorical perception’28.
Categorical perception gives rise to the following
phenomenon: stimuli from the centre of categories are
There are a limited number of facial expressionsa,
and these are perceived as categoriesb–d. Sorting
facial expressions was examined in L.E.W., a patient
with good comprehension but with much reduced
speech outpute. He showed a marked difficulty in
sorting colours and facial expressions. To test his
ability to sort facial expressions, we used pictures
taken from Ekman’s worka. His work had suggested
that photographs of emotional expressions 
were universally recognized, though there is
clearly considerable cultural interventionf. The
photographs were morphed to obtain a continuous
change from fear, to happiness, to angerb,c. The
morph procedure gave 15 equal-interval steps.
L.E.W. tried to do these perceptual categorisation
tasks by putting together identical items. As there
were no such items, he assessed the item that was
perceptually most similar to the first one he had
chosen. With colours that vary in brightness and
saturation, and facial expressions that are
multidimensional, perceptual similarity is difficult
to assess. Hence, L.E.W. put together items from the
different facial-expression categories (Fig. Ib).
L.E.W. did not spontaneously realize that he was in
error, although he was often unsatisfied with his
final choices. However, allowing more time did not
help him to correct his errors; he simply made
different ones. His inability to perform the task was
profound, as shown by the fact that he gained no
benefit from having previously watched a correct
sort (as in Fig. Ia).
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Box 1. Categorising facial expressions
(a) (b)
Fig. I. Sorting facial expressions into categories. (a) A control subject sorted the array of 25 facial expressions into categories of fear,
happiness and anger (top to bottom). (b) L.E.W. was unable to sort the faces into categories; instead, he attempted to find the face that was
perceptually most similar to the one he had just chosen.
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classified faster than those at the edges, and
consequently discrimination of stimuli is better
across than within categories. Our results with
Berinmo and English speakers demonstrated, in
three tasks with different instructions, that
categorical perception was consistently more closely
aligned with the linguistic categories of each
language than with the putative underlying
perceptual universals3,21.
The first experiment (see Kay and Kempton29)
showed that when making similarity judgments
between a group of three stimuli, observers judged
two stimuli from the same linguistic category to be
more similar, even though perceptual distances
between each pair of stimuli were held equal.
However, for those who made no linguistic distinction
between these categories, no reliable tendencies were
observable in similarity judgments. Thus, English
speakers showed categorical perception for stimuli
across the green–blue boundary, but not for those
across the ‘nol–wor’ boundary (see Box 2). The
reverse was true for Berinmo speakers27.
The second experiment was on category learning.
Participants from the two populations again showed
a dissociation between categories that they did or did
not distinguish linguistically. For English-speaking
subjects, the division between green and blue was
easier to learn than an arbitrary division of the green
category, and the division between yellow and green
was easier to learn than the division between the
Berinmo colour categories of nol and wor. For the
Berinmo, there was no difference in difficulty
between learning the green–blue division and
learning the arbitrary green division; however, the
nol–wor division was significantly easier to learn
than the yellow–green division27.
There are two types of colour naming. We can name
the colours of objects or we can name colours
independently of objectsa. These types of colour
naming dissociate in brain damageb. Both naming
the colours of objectsc and putting the correct name
to a colour patcha,d are difficult tasks for young
children, though evidence has been presented for
colour categories in babiese. Many languages are
also surprisingly deficient in colour names. The
colour naming of English speakers and that of the
Berinmo from Papua New Guinea are illustrated in
Fig. I. To obtain these colour names, participants are
shown individual Munsell chips, and are asked to
give a colour name in one word. The Munsell
system is used because adjacent steps in the
system were calibrated to be of equal magnitudef.
Rosch used the same procedure in her studiesg.
The Berinmo need only five words for the whole of
the Munsell colour spaceh. The Berinmo terms are
abstract, but all the terms do have an initial
reference to natural objects. The boundary between
these colours was used to show the effects of
categorical perceptioni. The colours within these
regions look more similar to the Berinmo than they
do to us; therefore they find within-category
decisions harder and cross-category decisions
easier than UK participants.
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Box 2. Colour naming
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The third experiment demonstrated an effect of
linguistic category, but this time in recognition
memory. English speakers showed significantly
superior recognition for targets from cross-category
pairs than for those from within-category pairs for
the green–blue boundary, but not for the nol–wor
boundary. Berinmo speakers showed the opposite
pattern; they recognised significantly more targets
from cross-category pairs than from within-category
pairs for the set of stimuli crossing the nol–wor
boundary, but not for the green–blue boundary27.
Put together, these three new cross-cultural
studies suggest that categorical perception shows the
influence of language on perception. At the very least,
our results would indicate that cultural and linguistic
training can affect low-level perception, as suggested
by Goldstone30. However, more than that, the results
uphold the view that the structure of linguistic
categories distorts perception by stretching
perceptual distances at category boundaries28,31.
It would appear that the internal colour space32 is
not static; some distances within it are ‘stretched’or
‘distorted’by the influence of linguistic categories.
Interference studies
With the constraints on experimental design required
to work with Berinmo, experimental intervention was
not possible to verify whether an essentially verbal
code might underlie categorical perception. However,
verbal suppression paradigms (see also Hermer-
Vazquez et al.33)have been applied to native English
speakers with results in accord with a verbal code34
(Fig. 1). In the study, the advantage for cross-category
judgments was examined in the same recognition-
memory paradigm used with the Berinmo27. Only
verbal interference removed the cross-category
advantage. Similar results were obtained with the
facial expressions shown in Box 1.
Constraints on language as the determiner of
categorisation
It is important to stress that the argument for colour
categories being a function of language does not lead
to an open house. There are constraints on colour
categorisation linked to the properties of the visual
system. The most important constraint would be that
similar items (as defined by perceptual
discrimination) are universally grouped together.
Thus, no language would exhibit categories that
include two areas of colour space but excludes an area
between them. The constraint can explain, for
example, why there is no language category that
includes yellow and blue but excludes green. There is
simply no associative chain of perceptual similarity
that could connect yellow to blue without passing
through green.
Another constraint concerns the type of
categorisation task. We are concerned here
predominately with perceptual categories. Even
perceptual categorisation tasks can sometimes be
solved simply by perceptual similarity or common
association. Monkeys, for example, can categorise
different exemplars of a 3 as the same as each other
but different from exemplars of a B (Ref. 35).
However, the categorisation task is simpler than
sorting colours because all within-category exemplars
are more visually similar than any cross-category
comparison. Other complex tasks can be solved by
associations common to exemplars. L.E.W., for
example, could use his intact knowledge to categorise
animal pictures as native or foreign on the basis of
those that are found in zoos15.
Conclusions
The evidence prompts the conclusion that perceptual
categorisation is determined by linguistic relativity.
The word ‘determined’ is used deliberately, even if
provocative. It is only by the application of colour
labels that categorisation can begin, and thus the
conceptual colour-naming train get going. To make
this conclusion clearer, a distinction needs to be
made between being able to attend to colour and
understanding colour categories. Comprehending no
colour names does not prevent children from making
use of colour attributes, rather than, say, shape
attributes, in problem solving36. However, even if
hearing colour names helps in directing attention to
the colour attribute of objects, the task of truly
comprehending colour names is different, and indeed
difficult. Soja36 informs us that normal two-year-old
children, who know no colour words, take, on
average, as many as 800 trials to learn the
apparently simple task of responding ‘red’ to red
objects and ‘green’ to green objects – solving the
Sorites paradox is not easy for the child. Indeed, we
could even speculate that human language might
have evolved to solve the otherwise intractable
problem of producing categories that cannot be
established by judgments of perceptual similarity.
A more moderate view would agree that
experience determines colour categories, but would
question whether verbal labels per se are necessary.
For example, important coloured exemplars37,38 in
the child’s world could promote, by the differential
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weighting through experience, the colour boundaries
within different cultures. The terms ‘nol’and ‘wor’ in
Berinmo, for example, also refer to whether leaves are
edible or non-edible27. But it is critical to remember
that the Berinmo use their colour names as abstract
terms27. They have the defining property of superior
cross-category discrimination28. It is by no means
clear how experience with exemplars would be
enough to allow this to be accomplished (see Fodor39
for the limitations of learning by association).
The importance of language for perceptual
categorisation seems less surprising, given the
evidence of linguistic relativity in other areas of
cognition. There is cross-lingual evidence to support
the Whorfian hypothesis in the number domain40, in
space41,42, time43 and even speech perception44. There
is also much evidence that language and cognition
interact: children readily extend new words and
assume words have a common referent. Indeed, the
role of language in stimulating categorisation is not
limited to the case of object concepts or simple
perceptual categories45,46. Gentner45 showed that
children would only generalize an abstract term such
as ‘symmetry’ if they learned a label to denote the
concrete-learning situation. On-going work will more
closely examine the development of perceptual
categories within the individual child.
• Can non-human primates form perceptual categories?
• There is evidence that neonates show colour categorisation. Does this
reflect categorisation of a different type?
• Are there capacity constraints on perceptual categorization?
• Verbal interference affects categorisation in memory tasks. Is the same
true for perceptual tasks?
• Which brain areas are involved in perceptual categorisation?
Questions for future research
